Iraqi women are already using their new political powers to
guard against extremism and intolerance in any form, whether it be
religious or secular.
-- President
George W. Bush, March 12, 2004
Part one of a two-part article on the future of women in
Iraq. This article looks at the future of women's roles in Iraqi
society and their equality under the law.
Over the course of the coalition's tenure, the desire to improve
and safeguard the social contribution, personal efficacy, and legal
rights of Iraqi women became an important component of the
Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) self-defined mission in
Iraq. Indeed, for a U.S. presidential administration that had
initially derided such concepts as nation-building and
interventionist "social engineering," the range of efforts made in
this area was remarkable.
At the CPA's insistence, the Transitional Administrative Law --
the interim constitution signed in early March -- includes not only
an extensive bill of rights, but also a guarantee that women must
hold at least a quarter of the seats in Iraq's elected national
parliament (the initial draft had set the minimum proportion at
40%). Soon thereafter, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a
$10 million Iraqi Women's Democracy Initiative, aimed at providing
training in "leadership skills, organizing political activities,
and other civil actions," and millions more have been allocated for
women's groups and business and professional development. The CPA
worked closely with Iraqi groups such as the Iraqi Higher Women's
Council, and launched partnerships with non-governmental
organizations such as the U.S.-Iraq Women's Network.
Such efforts have not been without controversy or direct
opposition, however. In late December, the Iraqi Governing Council
(IGC) passed a resolution seeking to revoke the country's
decades-old personal status laws -- among the most secular and
liberal in the region -- and to replace them with
sharia-influenced ones that the country's clerics would
administer. Because personal status law defines such basic issues
as marriage, divorce, child custody, and property inheritance, the
effects of such a change would have been dramatic. The resolution
was eventually withdrawn on a technicality (the IGC's meeting
lacked a quorum), under threat of veto by CPA Administrator L. Paul
Bremer.
The security situation has also had a dramatically negative
impact. In September, Aquila al-Hashimi, one of three women serving
on the IGC, was assassinated. A number of less senior Iraqi women
have also been threatened, as have public advocates of women's
rights. In March, Fern Holland -- a senior CPA women's rights
coordinator who helped draft numerous provisions in the interim
constitution -- was machine-gunned to death, along with her Iraqi
deputy and a CPA press officer. In late May, a second female IGC
member, Salama al-Khafaji, narrowly escaped assassination -- and
her son was killed.
Iraq's Future: A More Traditional Role for
Women?
What are Iraqis' views on these issues? What role do religious
values play in determining their views on women's rights, and to
what extent do the views of Iraqi men and women differ?
Last summer, the Gallup Poll of Baghdad found that 70% of the
capital's residents believed women should follow more traditional
roles than they had under the prior (Saddam Hussein) regime -- a
contention that male (72%) and female (67%) residents
nearly equally endorsed.
This particular manifestation of interest in the
re-establishment of traditional values may be easing, however. In
Gallup's latest nationwide survey of Iraq, only 53% of all Iraqis
-- and just 50% of all Baghdadis -- now say they believe women
should adopt a more traditional role than that which they had
before. Roughly a quarter of all Iraqis (26%) say they believe
women should have more freedom than they did before the coalition
invasion, while 14% say their degree of freedom should remain
essentially unchanged.
The desire for women to adopt more traditional roles is, of
course, strongly linked to religious conservatism. In strongly
Shiite areas of the country (68%) -- and in particular, the south
central provinces that contain the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf
(75%), strong majorities support this posture. By contrast, in
largely secular Kurdish Sulaymaniyah, just 10% believe women should
follow more traditional roles, while 82% believe women should
exercise more personal freedom than before the invasion.
Should Men and Women Be Guaranteed Equal Legal
Rights?
The 2004 Gallup Poll of Iraq also asked Iraqis whether they
agreed with the assertion that "Iraqi women must be given the same
legal rights as those given to men."
The result? Statistically equal percentages of all Iraqis
accepted (49%) and rejected (47%) the basic notion of gender parity
in regard to legal rights and privileges -- though women (53%) were
admittedly slightly more likely to endorse this notion than were
men (46%). In fact, outside the Kurdish northeast (self-governing
since 1992), an outright majority (54%) of Iraqis rejected the idea
that both sexes should enjoy equal legal protection.
Interestingly, opposition to male-female legal parity is
significantly higher in heavily Sunni areas than in areas where
Shiites are predominant. In strongly Sunni areas of the country,
those opposing a guarantee of equal legal rights for men and women
outnumber those in favor by more than 2-to-1 (66% oppose, 30%
favor). In the most heavily Shiite areas, however, the distribution
of opinion on this issue precisely follows the nationwide pattern
(49% favor, 47% oppose).
In addition to internal factors, these findings undoubtedly
reflect external theological and social influences as well. While
Western observers often tend to think of Shia as the more
conservative tradition within Islam, among Iraq's neighbors, it is
(Wahhabi-influenced) Sunni Saudi Arabia -- not Shiite Iran -- that
enforces far more rigid limits on what social roles, freedoms, and
degree of personal mobility are acceptable for women.
