It may shock women's rights advocates to learn that the large
majority of Baghdad residents (70%) say that in the future, women
should follow more traditional/conservative roles than they did
before the invasion -- a sentiment echoed nearly equally by both
men (72%) and women (67%). The remaining Baghdad residents are
split between favoring more freedom for women (15%) and favoring
the same degree of freedom for women (14%).
In comparison to some other Middle Eastern countries, the status
of women in Iraqi society was relatively liberal under Saddam
Hussein. According to one Islamic scholar in the United States, the
difference between women's roles in Saudi Arabia and Iraq is that
in Saudi Arabia, the women cannot drive cars; in Iraq, they drive
buses. The difference reflects the largely secular basis from which
women's rights were determined under Hussein, as well as the
pragmatic need for female labor in Iraq during the long Iran-Iraq
War.
So what will become of women's rights in Iraq once the people of
Iraq have the chance to craft their own system? The findings from a
question in The Gallup Organization's landmark survey in the city
of Baghdad* offer insight on this subject. This question was posed
to respondents: Thinking specifically about Iraqi women, do you
think they should have more freedom than before the U.S.-British
invasion, they should have the same degree of freedom as before the
invasion, or they should follow more traditional/conservative roles
than they did before invasion?
Responses to this question are highly similar across various
segments of the Baghdad population. Most women, as well as men,
believe that women should adopt more traditional/conservative
roles. Women are only slightly more likely than men to say that
women should have more freedom (18% vs. 13%). Two-thirds or more of
all age categories favor a more traditional role for Iraqi
women.
Formal education is one factor that does seem to increase
support for women's "freedom." The percentage saying women should
have more freedom in the future rises from 11% among those with
only an elementary education, to 26% among those who have attended
a university. But even a majority of those with university-level
education prefer a traditional role for women.
These educational differences on this question are reflected in
the differences by geographical region within Baghdad. Support for
maintaining or increasing women's freedom is greatest in Al Karkh
-- the most secular and prosperous district in Baghdad, where the
residents are more educated and also the least likely to think the
invasion has made things better. By contrast, inhabitants of the
predominantly poor and Shiite district of Sadr City are the least
likely to favor continued or expanded freedom for women, with 84%
saying they should follow more traditional roles.
Insights From Scholars of Islam and the Middle East
The status of women's rights under Hussein was somewhat mixed,
but it is clear that educational and career opportunities for women
were fairly advanced relative to regional norms. Do the Gallup
findings on this question mean that Iraqis would actually like to
reduce public roles for women, or do they mean merely that in a
time of war and upheaval, the notion of "tradition" has particular
resonance with the public?
More research will need to be done to say for sure. In the
meantime, Gallup presented these data to several U.S. scholars with
expertise on Islam and Iraq. The consensus was that these results
do not necessarily reflect a rejection of civil rights for women by
the public in Baghdad.
Yvonne Haddad, professor of history at the Center for
Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, believes
that in the context of this question, the concept of freedom --
"hurriya" in Arabic -- may have been interpreted as personal
licentiousness rather than political and economic freedom. This
interpretation would conjure up American stereotypes of sexually
loose and immodest women -- to which even the most progressive
Iraqi female intellectuals might object on cultural and religious
grounds. On this basis, Haddad cautions against reading this result
as a repudiation of women's rights.
Peter Sluglett, professor of Middle Eastern history at the
University of Utah, believes that the status of women under Hussein
was not nearly as advanced as many outsiders have assumed, given
the widespread repression, but points out that Iraq does have a
long tradition of advancement for women, dating back to the 1950s
and 1960s when the Iraqi representative to the United Nations was a
woman. For this, and a variety of other reasons, Sluglett does not
believe that a majority of Iraqis would accept or want women's
rights to be restricted.
"Saddam, unlike the Shah, could not so easily be denounced as
anti-religious," Sluglett says, "although his overtures toward
religion were not taken very seriously." He notes that reactionary
forces will have less opportunity to take hold in Iraq than they
did in Iran; there is no sense of over-modernization having taken
place, and also no sense of the country having sold out to the
West.
Bottom Line
The new Gallup data reveal the importance of language in
determining Iraqi opinion on the issue of women's rights. If the
debate is waged as a battle between "freedom" and a return to
traditional Islamic values, tradition is likely to prevail. But if
a future program of civil rights for women in Iraq can be separated
from the social culture of the West, presented as part of the
unique historical culture of Iraq, and somehow defined as not
entirely incompatible with Islamic values, then it may become a
reality.
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Methodology
